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Abstract: As job losses increased rapidly in 2003 amid calls for increased competitiveness, it
becomes all the more crucial to understand the character and causes of such industrial upgrading
that did occur in Ireland in the 1990s. This paper argues that despite a continuing reliance on
foreign investment, there were significant elements of local industrial upgrading within the Irish
economy in the 1990s. Contrary to perspectives which emphasise the learning effects associated
with foreign firms, the paper suggests that such upgrading only emerged when and where local
and national institutions were established to support relations of innovation and organisational
development. The current difficulties in the Irish economy can be traced in significant part to the
failure to deepen and extend this emergent system of innovation. The emphasis on
‘competitiveness’ in contemporary policy debate threatens to undermine the public investment,
social relations and collective institution building that have been, and will continue to be, central
to industrial upgrading in Ireland.
I INTRODUCTION
As the ‘Celtic Tiger’ runs into difficulties, it becomes all the more importantto understand the precise character of the transformations that occurred
in the Irish economy in the 1990s. This paper focuses on industrial change,
which was central to the improved growth and employment performance of the
Irish economy in the 1990s. How significant was industrial change in Ireland
and what factors might explain such transformation that did take place?
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The conventional explanation for the revival in Irish economic fortunes
since 1987 emphasises the ongoing commitment to Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) and free trade. Barry (2000) emphasises how a combination of shifting
external circumstances and domestic policies facilitated ‘convergence’ with
economies in the EU and OECD. Externally, a boom in FDI occurred at the
same time as the Single European Market project was being implemented,
creating an enormous opportunity for Ireland. Protectionist policies,
agricultural supports, low levels of education, prominent state-sector
monopolies and pluralist industrial relations inhibited Irish benefits from the
market between 1950 and 1988. According to this view, free trade, declining
agriculture, rising levels of education, state deregulation and ‘responsible’
central wage bargaining enabled markets to operate more smoothly in the
1990s and stimulated growth. Paul Krugman puts the conventional
explanation succinctly: “Thanks in part to luck, in part to policies …, Ireland
got a head start over other European locations in attracting what became a
surge of inward FDI; the early investments both generated a cascade through
informational effects and, eventually, created external economies that further
reinforced Ireland’s advantages” (Krugman, 1998, p. 51; see also Barry, 2000). 
Although inspired by dependency theory, O’Hearn’s explanation of Irish
growth shares with the orthodox economists the view that the dynamic of
industrial growth is driven by FDI, facilitated by a neo-liberal state getting
the conditions ‘right’ (O’Hearn, 1998, 2001). The logic is very similar to
Krugman’s: “American corporations made major moves to increase their
presence in the European market; they tended to agglomerate their new
projects to take advantage of the flexibility this allowed; and Ireland was
fortunate enough to receive a major share of American-owned electronics
projects in Europe because they agglomerated around other major firms such
as Intel” (1998, p. 153). FDI generates short-term growth spurts, it will not
contribute to the long-term development of the local economy for a wide
variety of reasons – the low levels of linkages between TNCs and the local
economy, the repatriation of capital and decapitalisation of the local economy,
the disarticulation of the local economy between an advanced, foreign
dominated sector and a backward indigenous sector (O’Hearn, 2001, p. 193). 
Where both dependency and orthodox economic accounts largely discount
the role of the state in structuring markets, Cerny (1995) argues that neo-
liberal globalisation has seen a greatly increased role for the state as an
‘enterprise association’ which promotes entrepreneurialism and competition.
Drawing on Cerny, Kirby (2002, pp. 142-144) argues that the Irish state is best
described as a ‘competition state’ which prioritises microeconomic inter-
vention, flexible response to competitive conditions and controlling inflation
and enterprise over maximising welfare through expanding the state vis-à-vis
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the market. For Kirby, while the state is pervasive within the Irish economy,
the state-society alliance underpinning what industrial upgrading has taken
place is seamlessly integrated with the demands of global competitiveness,
creating a ‘competition state’ (Kirby, 2002, p. 143). 
Where Kirby is rightly critical of the desirability of such a delimited role
for the state in the economy, the concept of the ‘competition state’ has been cast
more positively by certain important elements within the Irish polity. The
National Competitiveness Council closely monitors many aspects of Irish
society for their competitiveness implications while An Taoiseach, Bertie
Ahern, declared in April 2003: “This government does not believe that market
forces alone deliver growth and jobs. We have to be smart. We have to create
the conditions in which enterprise can flourish, while international capital
flows in to put our people to work in high value, high pay activity…. This is
the sort of State that I want to lead”. Both the approving and critical accounts
of Ireland as a Competition State share a similar logic of explanation of
industrial change – an extensive role for the state but one which adheres
closely to market principles.
Each of these sets of theories contributes to our understanding of the
Celtic Tiger. The points made by dependency analysts regarding the limits of
FDI as the basis of a development strategy are well taken. However, as the
orthodox economists argue, foreign investment can bring resources which can
be mobilised in an economic development strategy. Neither perspective offers
a satisfactory understanding of how local institutions and politics shape
whether the costs or benefits of FDI are emphasised. Kirby’s analysis of the
‘competition state’ gives a more central role to politics and points up the deeply
problematic relationship between growth and inequality in the Irish case.
However, by completely subordinating the politics of economic development to
the logic of the market, the concept of ‘the competition state’ unnecessarily
narrows our field of inquiry into the social construction of markets and the
possibilities for political and economic transformation contained within the
institutions that play a critical role in constructing those markets. 
This paper develops a ‘critical economic sociology’ of industrial change in
the Celtic Tiger that argues against the fetishisation of market processes
within both orthodox and critical explanations. First, I argue that, although
Ireland retained substantial elements of an entrepôt economy, there was
significant upgrading in the 1990s – particularly in the most dynamic and
technology intensive sectors. Second, the paper argues against the
conventional position of supporters and critics alike that this industrial
change can be explained by the greater conformity to ‘the market’ by the
institutions of the Irish economy. A shift in the institutions and state-society
relations within which industry in Ireland is embedded – more narrowly put,
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a change in the state-led national system of innovation – has been crucial to
industrial upgrading and evidence from a variety of studies supports this
interpretation of a positive ‘state effect’ on industrial change. Finally, I argue
that the ‘competitiveness’ agenda (particularly when focused on attracting
FDI) can undermine the very institutions which have been crucial to those
genuine gains that have been achieved during the ‘Celtic Tiger’ years. The
‘Celtic Tiger’ does not represent an ‘end point’ of a pre-ordained development
path but it is a terrain of political struggle where much remains to play for and
where the institutions which provided economic success may themselves be
potential tools of social and political transformation.1
II INDUSTRIAL CHANGE IN THE 1990S: UPGRADING 
WITHIN THE BUBBLE
FDI has been the bedrock of Irish industrial policy for four decades.
Throughout the 1960s FDI grew rapidly with foreign firms accounting for 2.3
per cent of gross output in 1960 but 15.9 per cent in 1973 (O’Malley, 1989, 
p. 102). The inflow of FDI in the 1960s and 1970s fueled a period of rapid
economic growth, although only minimally progressing beyond an ‘export
platform’ industrial structure and ultimately underpinning economic disaster
in the 1980s (O’Brien, 1986; Murray and Wickham, 1987; Eolas, 1989; Sklair,
1988). Has the FDI boom of the 1990s changed the character of transnational
corporations in Ireland? 
Foreign Investment: Upgrading Within Entrepôts
O’Hearn (1998) claimed that the deficiencies of FDI in Ireland rendered
the Celtic Tiger phenomenon a mirage, an artefact of creative accounting
rather than a genuine transformation in societal and organisational
capabilities. There is more than a grain of truth to this argument. Honohan,
Maitre and Conroy point out that “the Irish manufacturing sector contains
‘invisible entrepôts’ – intangible factors arriving and leaving like cargoes
through great transhipment ports” (1998) which are concentrated in the
sectors of chemicals, software reproduction, computers and production of cola
concentrate. These entrepôts are motivated by a desire to take advantage of
the tax benefits of an Irish location in order to retain the highest possible
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1 In this respect, the analysis in this paper has much in common with other perspectives which,
despite their diverse evaluations of the Celtic Tiger and its institutions, emphasise the role of the
political in shaping development processes (O’Donnell, 2000; Munck, 1999; Ó Riain and O’Connell,
2000).
share of profits on the proceeds of the intellectual work typically carried out
closer to the headquarters (usually in the US). These dynamics are further
intensified by the transfer pricing activities of US multinationals in Ireland
(Stewart, 1989) and by the character of much high technology industry where
the costs have increasingly shifted towards the design process (primarily
retained in the US) and away from the production process (which is more
likely to be located in Ireland). Clearly this activity is significant within the
Irish economy. Honohan et al. (1998) estimated that over one-third of
manufacturing output and approximately 10 per cent of manufacturing
employment was accounted for by these sectors. 
However, we cannot rely on this phenomenon, significant though it is, to
explain Irish industrial growth in the 1990s. First, this activity has been
present within the Irish economy since at least the mid-1970s (Honohan et al.,
1998; Stewart, 1989; O’Hearn, 1998) and has persisted across slump and
boom. Furthermore, focusing on this factor alone cannot explain the relative
upgrading of investment, research and development, skills and productivity
through the 1990s (see Table 1).
Table 1: Key Industrial Indicators in the Manufacturing Sector by
Nationality of Ownership 1991–1999
Nationality Key Indicators 1999 Percentage Change in 
of ownership Industrial Indicators 1991–1999
Total Output Labour R&D Employ- Profes- Output 
Employ- Costs as ment sional
ment % of Labour
Output Force 
% % % %
Irish 125,401 14,152,497 14.7 185.2 15.3 28.1 45.4
United Kingdom 12,660 2,308,864 12.7 –2.6 11.3 62.2
Other EU 23,852 3,111,358 14.9 18.7 49.1 98.7
All foreign:
141.6
United States of 
America 74,781 35,960,866 4.3 91.7 124.0 453.3
Other non–EU 10,826 3,260,475 6.8 –26.6 –1.8 94.4
Total 247, 520 58,794,060 7.8 141.6 26.5 50.4 181.4
Source: Unpublished Census of Industrial Production data, 1991 and 1999, provided by the
Central Statistics Office; R&D data from Forfás (1999).
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In manufacturing industry, investment flows increased and shifted
towards ‘intangible’ investments such as R&D spending. Manufacturing
employment increased over the period and saw a significant degree of
‘upskilling’, at least as measured by occupational category. ‘Administrative
and technical’ workers (these do not include clerical workers) grew by 50 per
cent across manufacturing, almost double the rate of general employment
growth. Although output figures are relatively meaningless for the entrepôt
sectors discussed above, it is striking that output expanded steadily across all
nationalities of firms (Table 1) and almost all sectors (as outlined below).
There was however a marked sectoral shift with rapid decline in ‘older’ sectors
such as textiles, clothing and leather, even as the ‘high tech’ sectors expanded
rapidly. Furthermore, output per employee grew steadily, within as well as
across sectors, indicating an increased level of productivity. 
In manufacturing, US owned firms are clearly the primary culprits in
pursuing entrepôt operations but these firms also had some of the largest
increases in investment and made a significant contribution to
professionalisation of the labour force. The foreign ‘food, drink and tobacco’
sector appears to be the only ‘pure’ entrepôt sector with investment and
employment falling as output increased. The other sectors – reproduction of
recorded media (software design and duplication), chemicals and computers –
all saw expansions in investment, R&D and some professionalisation.
However, in these entrepôt sectors, professional employment expanded only
marginally more rapidly than overall employment.
‘Other non-EU countries’, primarily Japanese companies, were less likely
to pursue entrepôt operations, had a much greater relative rate of
professionalisation within their workforces and made enormous leaps in terms
of productivity. This investment is of a ‘higher quality’ than US investment but
these countries have less investment in Ireland and that investment increased
less quickly than US investment. Accessing the EU is a major motivation for
investment in Ireland as investment from within the EU has been much
slower than from non-EU countries. However, investment from non-US firms
is more capital-intensive and professional-oriented than the massive inflow of
US investment over the past ten years has been. 
While there are striking entrepôt characteristics to foreign firms in
Ireland therefore, there is also evidence of significant industrial upgrading
across a wide range of sectors. We see growth almost completely across the
board in investment, R&D, employment, professionalisation and productivity.
Perhaps the central contradiction of Irish industrial development that has
fostered the controversies of recent years is that entrepôt activity and
industrial upgrading both occurred within the same sectors and even within
the same firms. An intriguing aspect of Irish development is the emergence of
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local deepening and upgrading from within these non-productive flows of
capital. 
This picture of relatively widespread industrial upgrading is consistent
with national trends in R&D spending and personnel. Gross domestic
expenditure on R&D was 0.6 per cent of GDP in 1981, 0.9 per cent in 1990,
1.28 per cent in 1997 and 1.21 per cent in 1999 (failing to keep up with the
surge in growth in the late nineties) – although still well below the EU average
of 1.8 per cent and the OECD average of 2.2 per cent. Consistent with the
labour intensive character of the Irish transformation, Ireland does
significantly better in terms of researchers per ten thousand labour force –
going from 17 in 1981 to 32 in 1989 to 57 in 1995, passing the EU average of
49 and the OECD average of 55. Among OECD countries, Ireland and Korea
show the fastest rates of increase in R&D spending in the 1990s – after
respectable average annual growth rates of 6.0 per cent in the 1980s Irish
R&D spending increased by an average of 16.7 per cent between 1991 and
1995 and 12.0 per cent between 1995 and 1997. The average rate of increase
in the EU from 1995-1997 was 1.9 per cent. Ireland shows by far the fastest
rate of increase of researchers – with increases of 7.4 per cent from 1981-1985
and 9.9 per cent from 1985-1989 (above the OECD average of 4.4 per cent). In
the 1990s when OECD growth slowed dramatically, the Irish researcher
labour force took off – increasing to an average of 10.5 per cent per annum
from 1991-1993 and 15.2 per cent from 1993-1996 (figures from OECD, 2000).
There is also evidence of significant transformation of activities within
firms. A 1996-1997 survey of a representative sample of enterprises in Ireland,
carried out by the Graduate School of Business at University College Dublin,
gathered data on a wide range of workplace practices and modes of workplace
governance. Roche and Geary (2000) find that, while there has been rapid
recent change within Irish workplaces, Ireland is not ‘ahead of ’ other
industrialised countries nor can the incidence of teamwork be used to explain
its growth performance of the past ten years. However, the survey results
show that there has been a significant shift towards ‘teamwork’ within firms
in Ireland (Geary, 1999; Roche and Geary, 1999). Employee involvement is
most developed in the area of quality improvement within teams, less so in the
organisation of work activities themselves and least of all in the control of
team and organisational boundaries (Geary, 1999, p. 877). 
Sectoral Differences in Local Learning 
The acid test of industrial development is the development of
territorialised, embedded industrial and innovation capabilities. Perhaps one
of the most surprising aspects of the Irish growth experience was the growth
of indigenous Irish industry in the 1990s. From 1991 to 1999 (and particularly
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after 1994) Irish-owned manufacturing industry saw significant rises in
investment, R&D, employment, professionalisation and productivity (see
Table 1). This would have been inconceivable in the 1980s when employment
in indigenous firms was plummeting. Nonetheless, despite these less than
promising origins, an indigenous sector emerged. A closer look at the structure
of Irish industry confirms that there were important changes alongside the
growth in output and employment (see Table 2).
Table 2 combines a number of sectors with similar characteristics together
into broader groupings. The first group of sectors falls under the heading of
the ‘knowledge economy’. These are sectors that are fundamentally based on
the processing of information or where, for the most part, indigenous firms
spend a similar or greater proportion of their revenues on R&D than the
OECD average for their sector (see Forfás, 1999, p. 12).2 As well as being the
most knowledge intensive sectors, these sectors are the fastest growing, in
terms of employment, output and R&D spending.
The sectors include: software, electronic and electrical equipment
(including computers and telecommunications), financial services and
instruments. Within Irish-owned electronics firms, Ruane and Gorg (2001)
show that the ‘high skill’ sub-sectors have increased their share of total
employment from 9.3 per cent between 1982-85 to 33.3 per cent between 1991-
1995. Although OECD statistics on R&D are not available for software and
financial services, R&D spending per employee clearly indicates that they are
among the more knowledge intensive industrial sectors. ‘R&D spend per
employee’ is a useful measure as it gives us a measure of R&D resources from
the perspective of employees, providing a sense of how much R&D activity and
resources workers might be able to avail of. Given the problems with output
figures in the Irish context, this measure gives us a significantly different
picture from that provided by ‘R&D spend as a percentage of output’, which is
a better measure of firm’s relative commitment to R&D (rather than other
investment, wages, profit-taking etc.)
In fact, the industrial statistics mask a more interesting set of
relationships among these sectors. Generally, software capabilities have
become increasingly important in information and communication technology
industries – even in sectors which are ostensibly focused on ‘hardware’. The
indigenous software industry’s major sub-sectors include communications
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2 Generally, care must be taken with such comparisons across OECD countries as the surveys
which form the basis of the figures are often not strictly comparable. Furthermore, given the
range of government incentives to increase R&D there is some danger that firms have inflated
their R&D spends in these statistics. However, the patterns are clear enough that we can identify
basic patterns within Irish industry, particularly given that these patterns reflect case study
evidence on the emergence of particular research based firms.
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software (with ties to the telecommunications manufacturing sector), banking
and finance software (with ties to financial services) and systems software
(with ties to the computing sector) (Ó Riain, 2004). This suggests that
something of a high tech ‘cluster’ began to emerge in the 1990s, consisting of
overlapping and interconnected sectors and underpinned by growing
competencies in software design and production which are being applied
across sectors.
The second group of sectors consists primarily of firms involved in general
manufacturing and sub-supply. We can divide these into two tiers – a first tier
consisting of sectors such as rubber and plastic, metals/metal products,
machinery/equipment where R&D spending is close to the OECD average and
a second tier of sectors such as chemicals and pharmaceuticals, non-metallic
minerals and paper, print and publishing where R&D is significantly below
OECD levels. These sectors are growing modestly but steadily. Overall, the
most sophisticated sectors of Irish manufacturing and internationally traded
services have been growing fastest in terms of employment, professional
employment and R&D spending.
Finally, we find a mixed picture in the ‘traditional’ sectors. The food sector
is large, forming the only ‘cluster’ within indigenous industry large enough to
show up in trade statistics (O’Malley et al., 2000).3 It grew steadily but
modestly with R&D levels close to the OECD average. Clothing and Textiles
collapsed while Wood and Furniture increased employment and grew in
sophistication (see Jacobson and Mottiar (1999) for an analysis of this sector).4
We can use these insights into the indigenous sector to cast some light on
the foreign owned sector, where it is extremely difficult to assess the
sophistication of firms’ activities, given the distortion of output figures by
entrepôt activities. Conventional measures of R&D spending as a percentage
of output do not give a true measure therefore of the level of resources
expended on R&D within firms. A better measure of the R&D resources which
employees can draw on within the firm is the R&D spend per employee which
is between £4,343 and £5,521 for these leading sectors (see Table 2). Table 3
presents an overview of the foreign owned sector, organised similarly to Table
2 for comparison purposes. 
R&D is a tiny proportion of output in almost every sector among foreign
owned firms. Clearly, the revenues generated in Ireland by foreign firms are
not being re-invested in developing local capabilities – Ireland has failed to
capture the rewards of these enormous revenues (many of which are of course
36 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
3 Although the knowledge economy cluster noted above might also be significant if more
informative industrial and trade categories were available.
4 The transport equipment sector has been omitted from the table as statistics were not available
by nationality of ownership.
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based on transfer pricing and entrepôt activities). However, R&D spend per
employee presents a more complex picture. Irish industry remains a better bet
in most sectors in providing employees with access to R&D funds. The gap is
particularly striking in software and instruments where a high tech image is
associated with decidedly low tech R&D levels among foreign firms. On the
other hand, foreign firms’ R&D spend in electronics and electrical equipment
is similar to indigenous firms (which spend over the OECD average), and
workers in foreign owned chemicals and pharmaceuticals plants have
similarly high levels of R&D funding available to them. 
Roche and Geary’s research regarding the diffusion of teamwork also
support a view similar to that in the industrial statistics – a significant
upgrading of organisational capacities across a range of sectors with the most
intensive upgrading concentrated in high tech and internationally traded
services sectors. Teamwork is most firmly established in firms in financial
services or high tech sectors and where product customisation is a critical
competitive aspect of the firm’s business and, perhaps surprisingly, teamwork
has spread most widely among Irish owned firms (Geary, 1999; Roche and
Geary, 2000). 
It is clear that a transformation took place in the 1990s that is significant
in terms of output, employment and R&D and organisational change.
Understanding the causes of these changes is crucial to the consideration of
policy responses to current job losses across a wide range of sectors.
III EXPLAINING UPGRADING: INSTITUTIONS OF INNOVATION
The analysis above suggests that foreign firms often have greater R&D
spending and more highly professionalised workforces than indigenous firms.
Many commentators have argued that foreign firms have been the major
contributor to learning and productivity improvement in Irish industry.
Notoriously disconnected from the surrounding economy, TNCs increased
their local purchasing of goods and services in the 1990s – even if in many
cases this was from other TNCs located in Ireland. In 1998, foreign-owned
manufacturing firms’ purchases of raw materials and services in Ireland
expenditures in the Irish economy came to 21.2 per cent of their sales,
compared to 55.0 per cent for Irish-owned manufacturing firms. Although still
predominantly organising themselves through global production networks,
TNCs were increasingly likely to purchase locally as purchases of raw
materials in Ireland as a percentage of total purchases of raw materials rose
from 13.2 per cent in 1988 to 22.8 per cent in 1998 among electronics firms and
from 15.4 per cent to 21.0 per cent for all foreign non-food manufacturing firms
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(Forfás, 1999). Furthermore, indigenous industry growth has occurred in
many of the same sectors as FDI and indigenous firm entry into
manufacturing sectors has been found to have been encouraged both by the
‘linkage’ effects of ties to foreign companies in those sectors and by the
presence of foreign companies as ‘markets’ in other sectors (Gorg and Strobl,
2002). 
The Limits of the Foreign Investment Explanation
However, attributing local learning predominantly to the presence of
TNCs exaggerates their impact. Analyses of Ireland’s growth performance find
that there are significant elements of learning and productivity improvement
that contributed to Irish economic growth in the 1990s, and which cannot be
explained by investment or improved education levels (De La Fuente and
Vives, 1997, p. 117; O’Leary, 2000; Durkan et al., 1999). It is striking that the
Irish case depends heavily on the contribution of labour and on a steadily
increasing unexplained ‘productivity’ of these flows of capital and labour.
Unlike the ‘Asian Tiger’ economies, high rates of investment do not play a
critical role in Irish growth. The Irish success story is not one driven by a logic
of capital investment but an increasing contribution of the labour force and a
rising productivity.
Furthermore, this cannot explain the emergence of Irish firms as
exporters in their own right, relatively independent of the TNCs where many
of their founders had gathered work experience. These entrepreneurs rarely
founded firms in directly comparable lines of business to the firms where they
had gained their experience – most TNCs offered experience in production and
areas that were of limited relevance to many of the technology development
oriented firms that have emerged in the 1990s (Ó Riain, 1997). Foreign
companies have only rarely been involved in any significant technology
transfer, joint venture or licensing relationships with indigenous firms.
Breathnach and Kelly (1999) find that firms which sub-contract with TNCs in
Ireland are slightly less likely to carry out R&D. Although 37 per cent of R&D
performing foreign firms were involved in research partnerships with higher
education institutions in Ireland, many of these connections involved
relatively routine contract research and only 17 per cent were involved in
partnerships with other firms (foreign or indigenous) in Ireland (Forfás, 1999,
p. 21). Similarly, foreign firms have had few investment relationships with
indigenous firms. Once again, foreign firms provide resources in the form of
sub-contracting, sales and career opportunities but these are provided at a
relatively low level of sophistication and cannot of themselves generate the
social and organisational institutions that might make it possible to take
advantage of them. 
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Comparing R&D spend per employee in Irish and foreign firms (Tables 2
and 3) shows that there is much to be explained in terms of the relation
between foreign and indigenous firms. There are sectors where employees in
both foreign and indigenous firms have seen growth to relatively high levels of
R&D spend per employee (electronics, wood/furniture) – supporting some form
of linkages argument. However, there are other sectors such as software and
instruments where the indigenous firms are much more sophisticated than
foreign firms – with much higher levels of R&D spend per employee and more
rapid growth in R&D. Finally, foreign firms in chemicals and pharmaceuticals
have relatively high levels of R&D spend per employee but this has not
generated employment or R&D growth among indigenous firms.
Institutions of Innovation: The Crucial Mediating Factor
Clearly, there are connections between TNCs and local upgrading – but
these must be explained rather than simply assumed. The issue of the local
capacity to absorb knowledge and engage in learning relationships is central
to understanding industrial change in Ireland and cannot be simply reduced
to the education levels of the labour force, given the mass emigration and over-
qualification of Irish graduates in the 1980s and 1990s. To understand why
Ireland could ‘under-perform’ with FDI in the 1980s while ‘over-performing’ in
the 1990s we need to understand the changing social and institutional context
of business development, learning and innovation in Ireland over this period. 
Although commentators often recognise in passing the contribution of
state industrial development policy to the turnaround of the 1990s, little
attention has been paid to the institutional system of innovation within which
firms in Ireland were embedded. Economists assume that the presence of
grants is itself an indicator of rent-seeking behaviour rather than exploring
the conditions under which state supports lead to rent seeking and when they
generate improvements in performance (Barrett, 1997; Barry, 2000; O’Leary,
2000). For example, economists often emphasise the ‘environment’ for
entrepreneurship, assuming that entrepreneurship is simply formed through
individual initiative. As we shall see however, entrepreneurship was
profoundly shaped and promoted by a dense network of public and semi-public
institutions. Furthermore, they also argue for ‘selection effects’ where the
‘shake-out’ of Irish industry left only the strongest firms standing, once more
justifying the claim of the market for the credit for the Irish miracle.
Unfortunately for the market however, the most innovative segments of the
revived indigenous industry are dominated by new firms, often in sectors such
as software and data communications that barely existed in the mid-1980s.
Before the industrial revival of recent years Irish industry had a very
weak presence in the traded sectors of the economy and in some respects it
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could be said that no coherent policy regime existed to support potential firms
which might emerge in these traded sectors. Nonetheless, in certain sectors,
state agencies played a key role in promoting R&D, business development and
the growth of indigenous firms in the 1990s. A certain amount of political
space emerged in the crisis of the 1980s for new institutional projects and
state-society alliances. A little recognised but highly significant alliance
between science and technology-oriented state agencies, technical
professionals and university constituencies emerged which supported the
deepening of technical capabilities and collective learning across the Irish
economy. This process was underpinned by the state as state agencies,
through their participation in this alliance, defined general priorities,
provided finance and institutional supports and legitimated this agenda.
These state agencies played a central role in upgrading industry and
deepening Ireland’s production and innovation capabilities in the 1990s, and
were themselves rewarded with a greater legitimation of their own position
within the state system – although they were never able to overcome the
dominance of the IDA-led emphasis on foreign investment. The emergence of
this alliance, embedded in both the global and the local and mobilising
resources from each, is the decisive feature which explains the transformation
in Irish technological and organisational capabilities in the 1990s (Ó Riain,
2004).
Elements of the state had already played a central part in transforming
the education system leading to a reasonable supply of skilled labour.
Furthermore, a reserve of emigrant professionals waited for opportunities to
return, doing so in large numbers from the mid-1990s. In the years around and
after the Telesis report, the state began to pursue a wider range of industrial
development strategies. New sectors had been added to the list of target
sectors – most important of which were software and financial services. State
agencies also acted to support emerging indigenous industry and to upgrade
the national system of innovation in three major ways (Ó Riain, 2000). By
defining the character of industrial strategies, implementing company
development through grant aid and creating an associational infrastructure
for innovation, the state has been able to contribute handsomely in the 1990s
to the development of indigenous industry and the upgrading of the national
system of innovation more generally. 
First, it acted to define the types of involvement in the international
economy which would be supported. The IDA provided valuable investment
and other support in particular sub-supply sectors, such as software manual
printing (Jacobson and O’Sullivan, 1994) and electronics. More importantly,
state agencies emphasised technology-related exporting in their support of
indigenous firms. In industries such as software design, the state development
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agencies focused grant aid almost completely on companies producing
software products for export – attempting to steer companies away from the
‘easy’ profits of labour contracting. The state acted in important ways
therefore to define the character of Irish industry, without attempting to
define the specific strategies to be followed by firms.
However, the state has also made more direct contributions. Its second
contribution was to ‘making winners’. Private capital was not a major factor in
the growth of Irish industry and it is only since 1998 that private investment
capital, from both domestic and foreign sources, has become abundant even in
leading sectors such as software. The state was therefore the major provider
of external capital to indigenous industry. Furthermore, this more direct
involvement of the state was significantly more effective in promoting
productive investment than previous schemes aimed at providing business
expansion funds for start-ups. These schemes, with less state agency
oversight, became more politicised and degenerated into subsidies for well-
established firms or into a peculiarly effective means of avoiding tax (see
Stewart, 1992).
The importance of the state in providing financing and in stimulating
private investment is indicated in Table 4 which provides data on private
equity investments between 1997 and 1999, the period when private,
increasingly international, investment surged in Ireland. These investments
are concentrated in computer related sectors, electronics, ‘other
manufacturing’ and (in 1999) communications. The Irish share of European
private equity investment increased from 0.3 per cent in 1995 to 0.8 per cent
in 1998 and 1.2 per cent in 1999.
In 1997 all investment was from domestic sources and one-third of that
was from the state. A significant portion of the remaining investment would
have been stimulated by the state through ‘matching funds’ arrangements –
perhaps up to an additional 25 per cent. In 1998 there is a sharp increase in
investment as domestic investment increases but, more importantly,
international investors flood into the increasingly successful Irish economy.
The primary source of funds was now private individuals as institutions such
as pension funds, banks and insurance funds lag behind. In 1999 – well into
the boom years – institutional investors took the lead in investment funds.
Non-European sources accounted for fully one-third of funds in 1999, up from
a quarter in 1998. 
By 1999 Ireland was well integrated into international institutional
investment circles and the state began to withdraw from its previously
dominant role as a source of funds. However, individual and institutional
investors largely followed rather than led the growth of the high tech
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industries in which most of this funding was concentrated. Although these
investors began to provide the large amounts of funding required by the most
prominent companies, they only did so once the growth potential of the
software industry and other high tech sectors had been clearly demonstrated.
Ironically, the risk taker here is the state, which was the primary source of
funding throughout the important period of initial growth and consolidation.
Table 4: Trends in Private Equity Investment 1997–1999 (000s of Irish
pounds)
1997 1998 1999
Total Funds 27,713 163,626 316,232
Total State Funds 10,048 20,775 12,151
Selected Major Types of Investors % % %
Government 36.3 12.7 3.8
Private Individuals 13.7 26.2 21.7
Banks 17.1 3.7 25.0
Pension Funds 7.3 8.2 26.8
Geographic Breakdown of Private Equity Raised
% Domestic 100 44.7 42.8
% Other European 0 35.7 19.6
% Other Non–European 0 25.2 32.0
Source: European Venture Capital Association, Annual Reports.
Furthermore, state agencies promoted a general company development
programme through their grant giving practices in a variety of areas including
marketing, management development, training and R&D. Grant giving
became more selective, as recommended by the Culliton Report (1992), and
state agencies ‘seeded’ venture capital funds. The precise form this took was
quite flexible depending on the company itself but the state agencies required
that such efforts at company development take place. Some IDA executives
had even been involved in company development in the 1980s before the policy
shift had found its way into official policy. 
Third, the state played a critical role in the creation of a network of
industry and trade associations, universities, innovation and technology
centres and other fora and groups which provide an associational
infrastructure for information-sharing, cooperation and innovation. While
these bodies are outside the state or semi-autonomous from it, in most cases
they have been founded through state initiatives and underwritten by state
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guarantees and funding. Nonetheless, they form a distinct layer of
institutional spaces and social networks between the state agencies and the
companies in the industry. A diffuse state influence throughout the industry is
built into the organisational structure of the institutions. These institutions
are typically located within the universities; staffed by academics and
industry people; usually have advisory boards containing industry, academic
and state representatives; and have extensive ties to industry through
consulting, information days and other activities undertaken at least partly
for funding purposes. In many ways these associations and networks perform
some of the integrative functions carried out within the corporation in
vertically integrated, large firms.
Assessing the Effect of Institutional Supports
There is significant a priori evidence that state supports have made a
difference. Agriculture remains perhaps the primary ‘cluster’ within the Irish
economy (O’Malley and Van Egeraat, 2000) and agricultural upgrading has
been underpinned by the emergence of significant basic and industrial
research capabilities within the universities and Teagasc. Stagnant since the
1960s, Irish tourism enjoyed the highest rates of growth in the OECD since
1986 and saw a significant upgrading in its ‘product’ as well as enjoying
greater international demand (Barrett, 1997). Barrett provides data that
suggests that public subsidy accounted for approximately 30 per cent of the
rapidly increasing investment in tourism, while the private sector accounted
for around 22 per cent. While he comments on the rent-seeking opportunities
generated by this funding, it seems much more likely that state support has
enabled this rapid expansion by providing valuable funds for ‘kick starting’
small and medium sized tourism oriented commercial operations, as well as
improving infrastructure. 
In manufacturing, O’Malley et al. (1992) find that in the 1980s “both new
and already existing grant-assisted industries have made a substantial
positive contribution to employment, and that existing grant-assisted industry
has had a substantially better employment record than corresponding non-
assisted firms” (1992, p. 89). Furthermore, they find that grant-assisted firms’
employment performance improved significantly faster than non-grant-
assisted firms and that this could not be explained by a one-time boost given
by the grant funding. They conclude that their analysis “suggests that the
grants were not only awarded more selectively by means of refraining from
aiding weaker firms, but that they were also awarded to the stronger firms
with good growth prospects in a manner or in a context which raised the
average performance of such firms in succeeding cohorts of grant recipients …
it is clear in the circumstances that job creation in relation to state
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expenditure must have improved considerably since 1984” (O’Malley et al.,
1992, pp. 97-98). 
Research in the software industry in the 1990s shows that indigenous
firms that received greater amounts of grant aid employed more staff, were
more likely to focus on products rather than services, more likely to export and
more likely to be involved in international technology and business alliances
(as well as less likely to be involved in subcontracting relationships) (Ó Riain,
2004). The statistical evidence regarding the positive effect of grant aid on
Irish software firms is supported by the statements of the firms themselves
(O’Gorman et al., 1997). While many firms complained about the
administrative demands of filling out grant applications analysis of grant-
aided and non-grant aided firms shows that through the early 1990s at least
grant aided firms significantly outperformed non grant aided firms – both in
the software industry (Clarke, 1995) and in the economy as a whole (O’Malley,
1992; O’Malley, Kennedy and O’Donnell, 1992). 
Although it is notoriously difficult to assess the effects of such institutions
on firms, a series of public and quasi-public evaluations have returned largely
positive assessments of various institutions and programmes – both by
international expert panels and by firms themselves. There is also evidence
that those software firms that rely most on universities as a source of
innovation are likely to produce products for export and to be engaged in
international technology alliances – suggesting that international techno-
logical sophistication is embedded in local institutions (Ó Riain, 2004).
There is strong evidence then that shifting state strategies have had a
substantial impact on firm performance. These strategies, embedded in the
social relations and practices of this ‘indigenous innovation’ alliance, have
contributed handsomely to making the connections between the TNC economy
and local upgrading.5 In the absence of this alliance, and its institutions and
practices, it is difficult to see how the Irish economy would have broken – to
even the extent it did – out of its vicious cycle of a ‘hollowing out’ of local
capacity by footloose capital and mass emigration. In each of the three broad
ways in which the state shaped the forms of market participation of firms, its
actions shaped social relations and the characteristics of socio-economic actors
such as firms. The upgrading that occurred took place as some of the elements
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5 One reason why an indigenous chemicals and pharmaceuticals industry has not emerged in a
similar fashion to the IT cluster is that the particular mode of Irish state intervention is not based
on mobilising large amounts of capital for science-based firms but on distributing relatively small
amounts of capital linked to employment – a model which has been used effectively by software
firms. The Science Foundation Ireland model of research funding does appear to be based on the
former approach, although it has to date remained dangerously isolated from the existing system
of innovation and indigenous firms.
of a ‘national system of innovation’ were still being developed – significant
research and investment funding only emerged after growth and industrial
learning were well under way (see Hobday, 1995 for a similar point regarding
industrial upgrading in the East Asian ‘Tigers’). State supported, socially
embedded relationships of technological and organisational learning were
critical to not only generating economic growth but also to creating the
coalitions which built political support for these new economic relations and
institutions.
IV A CONTRADICTORY ALLIANCE: SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND
MARKET COMPETITION
As economic growth has slowed and industrial employment declined in
2002 and 2003, policy debates in Ireland have focused heavily on
competitiveness. The consistent policy focus of the National Competitiveness
Council has been the restriction of public spending (particularly on social
services) and the containment of wage growth, among other components of
cost competitiveness. However, this response to industrial difficulties is based
on a misreading of the character and causes of industrial development in the
1990s. The low corporate tax regime, the declining share of public spending in
GDP and the focus on foreign investment can help explain the entrepôt
economy and the surge in employment in foreign firms. However, it cannot
explain the elements of industrial upgrading in the 1990s, such as increasing
levels of exporting, R&D and professionalisation.
There is no doubt that ‘competitiveness’ has become central to the
activities of the Irish state. Assuring a ‘competitive business environment’ has
been a central policy goal, ‘competitiveness’ has become a taken-for-granted
desirable value in public discourse and institutions such as the National
Competitiveness Council have been created to enforce the competitiveness
discourse in socio-economic practice. Although Kirby (2002) does not provide a
sustained empirical analysis of Ireland as a ‘competition state’, Ireland clearly
conforms to many aspects of the model. 
But the language of competitiveness obscures the roots of industrial
upgrading in a complex of public investment, social institutions and a network
of political and economic supports. There are other respects in which the Irish
experience is incompletely described by the ‘competition state’ model and
addressing these areas opens up important areas of political strategy and
action.
First, the notion of a competition state does not capture how the logic of
state agencies and social institutions differed from a purely market calculus
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and, therefore, it unnecessarily narrows our understanding of the institutions
underpinning economic growth. The national system of innovation is better
understood as a state and social embedding of market action, not as an
institution which is completely subservient to market competitiveness. Official
responses to job losses in Irish industry have largely taken the form of rote
calls for restored competitiveness when the roots of these difficulties are in an
industrial system where the system of innovation is concentrated on a small
range of sectors and where its institutions continue to have to battle for
resources within a system focused on the needs of foreign firms.
Second, the notion of a ‘competition state’ fails to recognise the internally
contradictory nature of “market liberalism” itself. In fact, as Polanyi (1944)
and more recently Granovetter (1985) argued, market relations are simply
unsustainable without some form of social embedding. Therefore, a strategy of
the creation of a disembedded market society, along the lines of the neo-liberal
political project, inevitably sows the seeds of its own destruction – albeit
creating enormous casualties along the way. Far from being smoothly
integrated with market competitiveness, the institutions of the system of
innovation in fact need to be protected from excessive marketisation of the
institutions of the economy and particularly from the growing financialisation
of its firms and institutions (Lundvall et al., 2002). The ‘short-termism’ of
financial markets and ‘flexible firms’ often only serves to undermine the
ongoing social relations of cooperative learning and investment in competence
building which are critical to innovation in a knowledge economy. 
Similarly, attempts to make innovation-supporting institutions
commercially viable have been largely disastrous. For example, perhaps the
primary reason for the collapse of the National Software Centre in the 1980s
was the conflict generated by the demands put on it to undertake a mission of
‘upgrading’ the industry, while at the same time requiring it to be
commercially viable. Caught between devolving into a development services
organisation or competing with the major firms in the industry, the Centre lost
industry support and was ultimately closed (Ó Riain, 2004). The Programme
for Advanced Technology (PAT) centres have also suffered at times under
pressures to be self-funding. One such centre was the Centre for Software
Engineering, widely recognised as an important part of the software industry’s
institutional support system, but which has been seriously damaged by recent
cutbacks in third level funding. More generally, the decline in public spending
as a percentage of GDP has manifested itself in the practical halting of third
level research funding, the increasingly mass character of third level
education and the crisis in primary school facilities and access. The
‘competitiveness’ agenda undermines the investment and collective institution
building which is crucial to industrial upgrading. If ‘laissez-faire was planned’
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(Polanyi, 1944) then laissez-faire also attacks the very planning which
sustains productive activity and ultimately the market itself.
Finally, this more complex, contradictory perspective on the global and
Irish political economies is not simply a quest for complexity for its own sake.
To simply describe the institutions of a ‘national system of innovation’ (NSI) as
oriented toward competitiveness ignores the many political possibilities that
the institutions of economic development present for future transformation.
The NSI can be undermined by neo-liberal strategies or it can be part of the
economic basis of a move toward the social democracy – indeed the concept of
the NSI, in its broad form as the social embedding of innovation activity, was
developed as a way to understand the economy which underpinned
Scandinavian social democracy (Lundvall et al., 2002; Mjoset, 1992). Rather
than reducing the complexities of institutions and politics in capitalist
development under globalisation to ‘competition’, we need to provide better
understanding of the effects and possibilities of institutions such as those of
the NSI as well as other critical institutional realms as industrial relations,
social partnership and the welfare state. A crucial part of this understanding
and politics will of course be the tracing of the concrete forms of influence and
power of transnational capital within these institutions and in industrial
politics.
V CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
This paper has argued that a significant transformation and upgrading
occurred in Irish industry over the 1990s, albeit within a ‘bubble’ of entrepôt
FDI; that this upgrading was promoted primarily by a state-society alliance
which developed new institutions of a system of innovation where the national
level integrates local, national and global elements; and that this alliance
should be seen as existing in a tense and contradictory relationship to the
institutions of the market, not as simply subservient to market
competitiveness. 
The analysis of industrial upgrading shows that the link between FDI and
local learning and industrial upgrading is a contingent one. FDI is less likely
than indigenous industry to generate a local dynamic of industrial
transformation – and it is not likely to prompt indigenous firms into upgrading
without a further local coalition that mobilises to that end. Local institutions
are critical in strategically building upon FDI and in supporting the
development of a new ‘logic’ of industrialisation within the economy. Perhaps
the major challenge that FDI poses to such a project of indigenous
development is that it tends to undermine the very institutions that are
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necessary to promote indigenous growth, by shaping the organisations of the
state such that they are focused on FDI and free trade rather than indigenous
innovation and local capabilities. However, such an effect is not inevitable if a
political coalition can mobilise against it.
Furthermore, the analysis implies that state and social embedding of
economic relations and the development of institutions which can shape
market relations are crucial to economic development. If tax concessions and
other measures attracted a disproportionate share of FDI to Ireland, it was
local non-market institutions, and crucially state aids, that supported the
industrial upgrading around them. This is a particularly crucial lesson, given
that the Irish experience of attracting disproportionate amounts of FDI, by
definition, cannot be replicated across a wide range of economies. It also
follows that low corporate tax in itself is not necessarily desirable for economic
development, as it was the role of lower Irish tax in attracting
disproportionate amounts of FDI which was critical. Low corporate tax in and
of itself has not been critical to growth and development. Once again, this is a
strategy that cannot be ‘exported’ indefinitely as there can only be a limited
number of ‘winners’ in such a game – and the implications internationally for
tax revenues are disastrous. Neither should we make a fetish of low personal
income tax rates – a dynamic economy supported by a rich national system of
innovation is compatible with much higher rates of tax than in Ireland (e.g.
Finland). Indeed, if low tax rates damage investment in labour and
institutions, they will undermine economic development. The most valuable
comparative lesson of the Irish experience is the continuing importance of
state intervention and state-society embedding of market relations, even in a
context of globalisation and regionalisation. State aids were a critical
instrument of policy – not for ‘propping up’ indigenous firms but for promoting
learning and inducing and supporting upgrading. Given this, the EU attack on
state aids is short-sighted and promises to undermine the possibilities for the
new EU members to ‘catch up’ effectively.
Finally, the understanding of Irish industry provided here suggests some
possibilities regarding tackling inequality and exclusion in the Irish political
economy. Since the most dynamic firms in the Irish economy are embedded in
networks of public and semi-public institutions, there are a variety of
possibilities for using such institutions to tackle social exclusion. Linking
active labour market policy more closely to the national system of innovation
would give communities and state agencies more leverage to negotiate firm
participation in training and labour market access programmes. Unions will
need to explore new strategies and issues for organising the most dynamic new
sectors (see Benner, 2002 for interesting examples from the US). The regular
‘skill shortages’ experienced by ‘high tech’ sectors offer regular opportunities
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for state and social actors to bargain with firms to promote measures to tackle
social exclusion through the institutions of social partnership and the system
of innovation.
All of this too is underpinned by a moral politics (Lakoff, 1996; Block,
2002). The critics of the ‘Celtic Tiger’ have rightly pointed to the missed
opportunities to tackle inequality and exclusion, but have yielded the story of
‘economic success’ to the market and have been left without a basis for arguing
for the responsibility and accountability of those groups that have experienced
enormous success in the market in the 1990s. The analysis presented here
implies a very different moral story to be told about the Celtic Tiger than that
offered by stories focused on the market. The ‘Celtic Tiger’ is not a product of
heroic entrepreneurs in the market but is a (partial) success made possible by
the embeddedness of entrepreneurs and workers in dense social institutions.
There is a significant collective contribution to the success of those who have
benefited ‘from the market’ and those social groups are therefore subject to
legitimate claims from those collective institutions. Society’s claim on the
technical-professional classes and entrepreneurs who have benefited most
from the ‘Celtic Tiger’ is not one of guilt or charity, but one of right, as the
success of these firms and social classes rests heavily on collective social and
state institutions.6
Recognising the importance of state and social embedding of economic
action not only makes for better economic policy but also opens up new
political possibilities within the Irish political economy. The state still matters
because (to use Cerny’s, 1995 terms) it is both a civic association, an arena for
advancing legitimate political claims, and an enterprise association,
promoting economic development. Understanding that market actions and
outcomes are deeply embedded in institutions of state and society provides not
only an account of institutions which can shape growth, development and
equality but also the starting point for a moral politics of the ‘Celtic Tiger’
which can provide a basis for legitimate claims upon the social responsibilities
of those social groups that have benefited most from the Celtic Tiger. 
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6 This paper has focused on the collective contribution of the national system of innovation to
success through industrial upgrading but we might also consider, among others, the contributions
of welfare state institutions and household labour to social reproduction, and of social partnership
institutions to collective problem solving and infrastructure development. 
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